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Surgical technique and the control of
infections that can follow surgical proce-
dures are part ofthe grim facts ofwar. It is
a terrifying irony that while men strive on
the battlefield to find more efficient and
faster ways of killing other men, forms
dehumanized as the "enemy," human
beings behind the lines of"glorious" battle
strive with equal vigor to find more effi-
cient and faster ways of saving the pre-
cious lives ofthose whom they see as nei-
ther allies nor enemies, but as fellow
humans. For the surgeon, war is never the
glory ofbattle or the quest for victory. It is
never hard and constructed of metal. Its
focus is neverthe distantentity at which he
aims. For the surgeon, war is between his
hands. It is so hard for the soldier on the
field to associate the trigger he pulls and
the hard projectile he fires with the grue-
some damage inflicted upon the delicate
human flesh and bone with which that
small projectile collides. This is the asso-
ciation that the war surgeon is forced to
make with every soldier thrown onto his
operating table. War surgery has its own
horror because it is never elective. The
enemy's weapons of pain have made the
first incision into the body and the surgeon
is compelled to remedy the dangerous
incursion of an evil operation.
Naturally, the scores of wounded
simultaneously become an extensive,
albeit dreadful, schoolroom for the sur-
geon. During the course of the American
Civil War, savage fighting threwAmerican
surgeons into the most terrifying school-
room they would ever be cursed to see. It
is a sad fact of history that while weapon-
ry in warfare was advancing, the simulta-
neously advancing tools and techniques of
medicine and surgery were still behind the
weapons. The surgical advances stimulat-
ed by the human damage inflicted during
this war were not isolated discoveries, but
rather a substantial part of the continuum
of scientific and medical progress made
during the nineteenth century. Earlier
advances in the use of anesthesia made
most of Civil War surgery possible. But
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much ofmedical and surgical practice was
still open for debate, and the war of 1861-
1865 became, in effect, a testing ground
for conflicting theories - a testing ground
made possible by the forced sacrifice of
thousands of wounded soldiers. While
Civil War surgeons and surgical theorists
made significant contributions to anesthe-
sia, the management of hemorrhage, and
amputation procedure, realized the danger
and learned to understand the spread of
infection, developed antiseptic method,
recorded their findings and data, and pro-
vided the post-war nation with a core of
experienced surgeons, the facts that scien-
tific advancement by experimentation is a
slow and costly process and that the med-
ical corps was hampered by ineffective
administration in a wartime govemment
sadly prevented these advances from pro-
viding substantial new aid to wounded sol-
diers during the war.
During the American Civil War
approximately 620,000 men lost their
lives. Almost every family or group of
people in the country directly felt the sac-
rifices of this clash between the United
States Government and the seceding Con-
federation of southern states.
While the weapons ofmodern warfare
made it possible to kill many soldiers
instantly, the number who were wounded
and later died of their wounds is stagger-
ing - 110,000 recorded in the Union
army alone [1-3]. Treatment of wounds in
war is largely dependent on the weapons
and tactics used in the fighting. Most
injuries during the Civil War were inflict-
ed by a soft, lead, conoidal bullet fired
from a musket [4]. Since the area oftissue
and bone affected by a bullet's collision is
inversely proportional to its velocity and
directly proportional to its cross-sectional
area, the damage done by these round,
slow-moving projectiles was devastating
to both flesh and bone, opening large
wounds that were directly susceptible to
infection, especially in bone joints. The
softness of lead made it malleable upon
impact, so that the deformed bullet, while
not being sanitized by speed, pulled pieces
of clothing through torn skin and could
lodge itself in tissue and alongside bones,
badly lacerating the surrounding soft parts
of limbs and spreading numerous bone
fragments [5].
While soft lead wrecks havoc when it
collides with bone, most CivilWar soldiers
were lucky that more hits were sustained
in the arms and legs than in the abdomen,
thorax, neck, or head. Gunshot wounds to
the limbs comprised 71 percent of all
wounds. Eighteen percent were in the
torso, and 11 percent were in the neck,
face, or head. Of torso wounds, there were
three times more in the thorax than the
abdomen. These statistics for wounds
incurred from any weapon lowered the
mortality rate substantially. This was a
result oftactics, for in the face ofrapid-fire
weaponry soldiers most often hid behind
some sort ofcover, such as trees, rocks, or
earthworks, thus protecting the large part
of their bodies [4].
Contrary to what contemporary films
on the CivilWarwould indicate in terms of
lines of soldiers walking directly into can-
non fire or engaging the enemy at full
speed with the bayonet, few injuries were
incurred as a result of cannonball or cut-
ting weapon. Of 144,000 recorded wound
cases by fire, 108,000 were hit by Minie
Ball, 16,000 by round ball, 12,500 by shell
fragments, 359 by cannonball, and 130 by
explosive bullet. For instance, during the
Battle ofthe Wilderness 500 cannons were
used, but only 12 soldiers were hit by can-
nonball [4].
These wound results were the product
ofthe tactics ofa new, mechanized form of
warfare. The development of rifled mus-
kets and conoidal bullets, which increased
the effective range of fire from about 100
yards to 300 to 500 yards, forced the fight-
ing to take place at long range and practi-
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was still only effective at 200 to 300 yards,
making artillerymen targets for enemy
musket fire, which forced cannons to take
on a defensive role behind the infantry
lines. This increased range and the fear
that new recruits have of bare steel made
bayonets largely unused by infantry and
sabers shunned by the cavalry in favor of
pistols or revolvers [1]. Thus the wounds
that arrived on the operative table reflected
the course of the fighting.
Despite the fact thatblades were hard-
ly ever used, the pain inflicted by firearms
was an excruciating torture to soldiers.
Pain was a constant factor in the manage-
ment ofpatients, both physically and psy-
chologically. Hannah Ropes, a Civil War
nurse who made extensive efforts to
improve care for wounded soldiers, wrote
in one of her letters of a young man suf-
fering the pain of a gunshot wound:
I am sitting by Larh, who lost his hand. He
never kept still a moment, I believe, and it is
awful hard to keep such a mercurial tempera-
mentfrom opening afresh the wound, and ifit
does again, the doctor says he must bleed to
death. I have just told him I am amind to
throw him out of the window, and he says he
wishes I would [6].
For this reason the participants in the
Civil War were relatively fortunate to be
fighting in the century during which anes-
thesia was beginning to take arole in med-
icine. Chemical possibilities for surgical
anesthetics had been recognized as early
as the late decades ofthe eighteenth centu-
ry with the discovery ofhydrogen in 1766,
nitrogen in 1772, and oxygen and nitrous
oxide in 1774. Ether, later to become one
of the major anesthetics, was first used as
a treatment forasthma in 1785 and the first
publicly reported operation under inhaled
ethyl ether tookplace in 1842. Chloroform
emerged on the medical scene simultane-
ously in the 1830s [7, 8].
It often seemed that surgeons were
mere monsters, inflicting pain upon the
helpless casualties ofbattle, but the record
of use of anesthetics indicates that sur-
geons were indeed trying to reduce pain as
much as possible [4]. Hannah Ropes wrote
of many a disagreement with physicians
over patient care, but she was also eager to
praise those she saw as true and benevo-
lent healers:
Over the bed of a man with a bullet in his
thigh I shook hands with Dr. Hinkle. How
gentle he was to the suffering soldier; and
how vigorously he worked to relieve him!
Looking up full in his face at the first breath-
ing spell, I was struck with his paleness, as
well as the beauty ofhis manner ... [6].
Anesthetics were often used even to
change dressings and while opium pills
were most commonly used to alleviate
pain, doctors began experimenting with
morphine applied directly to the wound or
injected with syringe [4].
When it came to general anesthetics,
which undoubtedly made most surgical
procedures even fathomable, there were
still extensive debates. There had been
numerous mishaps with chloroform and
ether during the Crimean (1854-1856) and
Mexican (1846-1848) Wars and many con-
servative doctors fought against their use
in 1861. Arguments were put forth by the
nineteenth century's leading physicians.
British Surgeon General George James
Guthrie felt that the excitement of the
injury was a sufficient stimulant to carry a
patient through a rough procedure. Dr.
Alfred-Armand-Louis-Marie Velpeau was
convinced that the shock that immediately
followed injury would decay into depres-
sion, a danger potentially exacerbated by
anesthesia. Dr. Thomas Cole thought that
pain was a necessary stimulant to bring a
patient out of shock. Despite these con-
cerns, however, anesthesia was used exten-
sively during the war, probably as a result
of the invasive operations which surgeons
wanted to perform. The chemical used
most commonly was chloroform, favored
for its small size, faster action, and nonin-
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in the field, but doctors were still unaware
that ether was dangerous in cases of shock
because it exacerbated hypotension
through its vasodilatory action, often
bringing abouthemorrhaging. Chloroform,
however, had its dangers as well, which
had been observed in civil practice in the
years preceding the war. An overdose was
easy to administer and would instigate car-
diac paralysis. In addition, doctors interest-
ed in experimentation also tried a mixture
of ether with chloroform, which we now
know to be extremely hazardous [4, 9, 10].
War records indicate that general
anesthesia was administered approximate-
ly 80,000 times, 76 percent with chloro-
form, 14 percent with ether, and nine per-
cent with the mixture. Ofthese, there were
37 deaths due to chloroform, four due to
ether, and two due to the mixture. Consid-
ering the fact that chloroform, easily mis-
used, was the drug always administered in
the field, and that war anesthetists were
naturally underagreatdeal ofpressure and
suffering from fatigue, this mortality rate
is staggeringly low. They were undoubted-
ly aided by the fact that operations were
performed in open air, which diluted the
drug before inhalation. The complete rea-
son for such success is still uncertain, and
contemporary surgeons were surprised but
at the same time confident in the new prac-
tice. It is apparent that the procedure of
administering anesthesia was greatly
improved during the war, and post-war
civil medicine gained a great deal from
this "practice." Civil War anesthetists per-
fected the method of dropping the chloro-
form on a towel that would be placed over
the face until a full dose was given [4].
While pain was indeed a constant
cause of suffering for the wounded man,
the sight of blood was often even more
psychologically debilitating. While anes-
thesia, an effect of human intervention,
had an extremely low mortality rate,
deaths due to bleeding were, despite the
minimal hemorrhaging involved in gun-
shot wounds to the extremities, apersistent
and very real danger [11]. While the
wounds inflicted by cutting weapons were
few, when hemorrhaging did occur, espe-
cially in the thoracic or abdominal cavi-
ties, blood loss increased fatigue and wors-
ened the state of shock, extremely worri-
some factors as far as the surgeon was con-
cerned. Tourniquets had so often been
used improperly by stretcher-men that
most surgeons prohibited their use on the
front lines, but the fact remained that
blood loss was a problem that had to be
dealt with quickly, lest a soldier be
allowed to bleed to death. This fear of
bleeding resulted in the cessation of the
use oflancets and leeches to bleed out dis-
ease and the prohibition of both by the
medical departments on both sides [4].
Many modern surgeons see the devel-
opment ofligature technique as one ofthe
most important legacies of the war. More
and more, surgeons practiced with pres-
sure dressings and ligatures, especially in
the treatment of external hemorrhaging.
Despite errors, such as leaving the silk
string exposed when tying off internal
hemorrhages, the technique of tying most
ligatures was perfected. The realization
that a ligature was required both above
and below a wound to stop bleeding fully
was realized during the surgeries of this
war [1].
But the fact remains that bleeding due
to gunshot wounds usually ceases after the
onset of syncope. Therefore, considering
that most wounds were to the extremities
and that the art of ligatures was being
acquired, the consequences of gunshot
wounds were often of a more long-term
nature - thus Civil War surgeons
addressed the nineteenth century debates
with regard to amputation. The conserva-
tives favored the attempt to save the limb,
while the radicals saw the lifesaving merits
in speedy amputation. After the amputation
mishaps of the Crimean War, most Euro-
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British Surgeon General Guthrie even pub-
lishing a directive discouraging amputation
except in cases of a direct hit by cannon-
ball. The U.S. Sanitary Commission, creat-
ed in 1861, republished this work and
manyAmerican surgeons followed its prin-
ciples to the word. After a substantial num-
ber of soldiers had died due to incorrect
diagnoses with regard to amputation, the
Commission published another article by
an American surgeon, D.D. Slade, who
encouraged amputation, especially in cases
of bone splintering. More and more, as
conservative surgeons were faced with the
sight of gruesome battlefield injuries, they
gravitated toward the radicals. While the
conservative approach was accepted by
many to be more feasible in a hospital set-
ting than on the battlefield, soldiers natu-
rally preferred it, often begging, bribing, or
even demanding with the diplomatic lever-
age of a revolver to keep their limb [4].
Meanwhile, many surgeons were still eager
to amputate, demonstrating both an accep-
tance of the consequences of allowing a
man to keep a badly damaged limb and a
desire, especially among young surgeons,
to learn the art. John Vance Lauderdale,
M.D., was such a young surgeon assigned
to a navy gunship. He wrote enthusiastical-
ly ofbeing given the authority to amputate:
When he came and told me to go ahead and
amputate, which I did with that kind ofplea-
sure which no one but a surgeon can feel. This
amputation was made at the junction of the
lower & middle of the thigh with a double
flap ofintegument & a circularincision ofthe
muscles. Dr. Brownwell tied the vessells, and
we madejust the finest stump you ever saw.
It was such eagerness that gave ampu-
tation surgery such a bad name during the
war [12].
Despite cries against excessive ampu-
tation, especially after the bloody battle of
Antietam, it was largely accepted, except
by the die-hard conservatives, that ampu-
tation was often the only option. In
response to public outcry after Antietam,
Union Medical Director Jonathan Letter-
man replied thathe thought there had actu-
ally been too few amputations. Modem
physicians agree with him, many medical
historians now assessing the number of
amputations as almost inadequate. Mean-
while, the problems inherent in not ampu-
tating were made much worse by the
actions of the conservatives. In many
instances, lives could have been saved if
the wound had been left alone, but most
surgeons attempted, using septic probes,
most often bare fingers, to get at the bullet,
findbone fragments, andresectportions of
bone. The problems arising from this dirty
exploratory surgery, in which the wound
was generally ripped even further open by
an aggressive surgeon, were generally
pyemia at worst and osteomyelitis at best.
The troubles caused by this meddling
eventually led the Sanitary Commission to
urge surgeons to avoid such exploratory
procedures, except when vital. If amputa-
tion was to be avoided, it was best to step
back from the wound [4, 13].
The circumstances of orthopaedic
surgery would have been better if there
had been a more developed use of splints
to stabilize limbs. The army developed
"Smith's Anterior," a device which sus-
pended a soldier's leg from the ceiling of
an ambulance carriage, but this tool was
widely misunderstood and seldom used.
The greatest contribution of the Civil War
to orthopaedics, however, was the Hodgen
splint, developed in 1863 by American
John T. Hodgen. This device, still used
today in a similar form, provided a better
extension of the limb, did not allow con-
traction, put no additional pressure on the
bone, was relatively comfortable for the
patient, and left the wound exposed for
dressing and drainage while still held in
the splint [4].
Ifabone was not thoroughly damaged
by theroughride to the field station behind
the lines and it was determined that ampu-
tation was the best option, as it most often174 Weiss: Medicine and surgery during the American Civil War
was, there was still debate as to which pro-
cedure would be implemented. This again
was a debate among surgical theorists of
the nineteenth century, which was played
out upon the wounded during the Civil
War. The flap operation, developed by
William Cheselden in the eighteenth cen-
tury, was the old, favored approach. It had
the advantages of speed and the produc-
tion of a better stump over the newer, cir-
cular operation. The flap operation did,
however, remove a larger portion of the
limb and left a wider wound. The exposure
these two operations left to possible infec-
tion, the sloughing ofthe flesh they inflict-
ed, the hemorrhaging they risked, and their
post-operative resistance to transportation
were debated well into the twentieth cen-
tury. Each surgeon hadhis opinion andfol-
lowed the doctrine of his choice while the
debate raged back and forth between the
theorists. This debate, it turns out, was a
moot point. Today, surgeons use both
methods, depending on the circumstances
of the wound. The problem during the
Civil War lay in leaving insufficient flap,
which created a conical stump, and in
beginning with the flap operation and end-
ing with the circular, leaving variable but
generally disastrous results. Whatever the
procedure used, however, it was almost
universally agreed at the time that amputa-
tion must be primary, that is, within twen-
ty-four hours after receiving the wound,
before the "irritative" stage took over and
infection led quickly toward a useless limb
or death. The rise in the mortality rate
when amputation was left to the next day
was in conflict with the fact that surgery
before the patient rallied from shock was
extremely dangerous. But the volume of
wounded precluded many of these consid-
erations, and many procedures were per-
formed while the patient was still in shock
or, possibly, had been given liquor in the
attempt to rally him. Delay often meant,
considering the poor antiseptic conditions,
septicemia, and septicemia often meant a
sure and painful death [4, 14].
While advances in surgical technique
were indeed important, by modem stan-
dards Civil War surgery was the last
moment ofprocedures and ideas ofan ear-
lier age. Historian George Worthington
Adams reflected that there is "such a gulf
between the methods of that day and the
aseptic routine of our own that centuries,
not a mere two generations, might well
have separated 1865 and 1914" [4]. The
combination of anesthesia, which permit-
ted surgical experimentation, and the
absence of full antiseptic procedure until
the decades after the war meant a high rate
of wound infection [4]. While performing
procedures that are easily comparable with
those of today, Civil War era surgeons
broke almost every rule of antiseptic
method. They never scrubbed their hands
sufficiently, wore a sterilized gown and
mask, nor used sterilized instruments and
sutures. When water was distant, surgeons
in field hospitals would work for days
without washing. As he waited for the next
man to be placed on the table, the surgeon
would stand back near the recently ampu-
tated limbs, holding his knife in his boot or
even between his teeth. Due to these
deplorable conditions, it is no wonder that
infection was the war's leading killer [1].
Infection was, in fact, so common that the
pus-producing staphylococcus infection
was widely thought to be entirely a
method of normal body repair. When a
wound healed without suppuration, it was
thought to be unusual. But as cleanliness
gained favor and more and more wounds
healed without suppuration, surgeons
began questioning their tenets of healing
process. It was gradually realized during
the war that pus was not an entirely inter-
nal process, but rather the result of exter-
nal factors. As pus-formation seemed to
spread from one patient to another in hos-
pitals, it was soon hypothesized that infec-
tion was airborne [4].Weiss: Medicine and surgery during the American Civil War 175
However, while Lord Lister published
his first paper on antisepsis in 1867, after
the war, it is erroneous to conclude thatthe
CivilWarwas foughtentirely withoutanti-
septic method. He was indeed the first to
advertise carbolic acid as an antiseptic, but
did not invent it and was not by any means
the first to use it. The Sanitary Commis-
sion eventually took great pains to try to
clean up camps, field hospitals, and city
hospitals. CivilWar surgeons actually used
multiple antiseptic chemicals, mostly in
hospitals, but did not know the time and
place to use them. Infection often took
hold before they were used because the
nature of the bacteria and the spread of
infection was still not understood [4].
Chemicals such as iodine, bromine,
bichloride of mercury, and hydrochloric,
sulfuric, nitric, and nitrous acids were
extensively used in hospitals, but their
ineffective application made infection a
continuing problem. Part of the difficulty
was the American Medical Association's
1864 campaign for ventilation of the hos-
pitals, which attracted attention away from
the patient to the surroundings, exaggerat-
ing the capacity for air to transport infec-
tion. By this campaign, the air was kept
clean while the bandages wrapping the
patient's wounds were as dirty as they had
ever been. For instance, throughout the
war no one ever thought about sterilizing
surgical instruments [11]!
Misunderstanding the nature ofinfec-
tion made treatment an enormous prob-
lem. Too often infection was allowed to
run its full course until it was too late for
any medicine to help. John Vance Laud-
erdale recognized this deficiency in the
medical practice ofthe day:
We can't stop and talk with each patient,
making such a careful examination as we
would do in private practice or in a hospital,
but we administer such remedies as we think
will do them some good and pass to the next.
There are several very sick men - their dis-
ease is typhoid fever. We lost one this morn-
ing, and we fear many will go off before
[tomorrow] morning. Our treatment of these
cases is very unsatisfactory, because we do
not see them till the disease has nearly
destroyed them. I would almost as soon die in
battle as to fall a victim to fever ... [12].
The primary medical treatment for
most infections was liquor and quinine,
although mercury was also occasionally
used. However, even in the midst of the
war some werebeginning to doubt the use-
fulness, or even the possible benefits, of
alcohol. Today, its use is definitely
shunned, especially in cases of infection,
because liquor leads to fatigue and the
body generally needs all the strength it can
muster [4].
Although advances in the understand-
ing of infection and its spread, the devel-
opmentofantiseptic method, andadvances
in surgical procedure were substantial con-
tributions to medical science, their faulty
implementation during the waryears made
the scientific gains only a modest aidto the
thousands of wounded. First of all, scien-
tific advancement is never immediately
accepted. Debate is a natural part of
progress. The Civil War was, with regard
to infection and surgical developments, a
time of such debate. Therefore it was
always hard to make every physician agree
upon new principles. Those who main-
tained their own ways were sometimes
later proven to be correct, and sometimes
lost many wounded men in the process.
This friction against advancement was
combined with the fact that the medical
departments on both sides were operating
under conditions of war. Although by the
time of the Battle of Cold Harbor in July
1864 there was a completely organized
U.S.Army Medical Corps prepared tohan-
dle mass casualties, the wounded fleeing
from the First Battle of Bull Run in July
1861 had no hospitals to flee to in Wash-
ington. At the start ofthe war, hierarchy in
the medical corps was based on seniority,
rather than merit, which, until about 1864,
saturated the field with medical officers176 Weiss: Medicine and surgery during the American Civil War
whose ideas and methods were becoming
obsolete [1]. While the Sanitary Commis-
sion urged commanders to clean up their
facilities, their dictates were often ignored,
as was reported by William H. Van Buren,
M.D., to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton
in May 1863:
More than a year ago the very bad condition
of Camp Douglas and its hospital was recog-
nized by the president of the Sanitary Com-
mission on . . . inspection and reported to
Colonel Hoffman, U.S Army . . . It was
promised by this officer that the evil should
be remedied.
By recent reports ... from two eminent mem-
bers of the medical profession . . . employed
by the Sanitary Commission as special
inspectors of hospitals, it is evident that the
improvements promised by Colonel Hoffman
have not been made and that the state of the
hospitals in question is many degrees worse
than when his attention was called to the con-
dition of its inmates [15].
No matter what surgeons did in terms
of more efficient anesthetics to relieve
pain, ligating to prevent fatal hemorrhag-
ing, and improved amputation procedure,
if there were not sufficient ambulances to
get the wounded to the field hospitals and
sanitary measures to keep them from con-
tracting infections in their weakened state,
many were still lost.
While the sacrifice that these wound-
ed men made to medical science is tragic,
the results in the post-war years were sig-
nificant and substantial. This war was,
importantly, the first in which medical data
were conscientiously recorded. These
records were later compiled in the monu-
mental publication of 1870, The Medical
and Surgical History of the War of the
Rebellion, which is studied by both histo-
rians and physicians to this day [1]. In
addition, the core of the nation's medical
care apparatus was established by the now
experienced veterans of the Civil War.
Among the 15,000 medical men who had
seen military service and who could now
deliver adequate medical care in even the
most rural areas of the country, physicians
like S. Weir Mitchell, George R. Moor-
house, and William W. Keen became the
core of academic medicine and medical
research in the late nineteenth century [4].
The medical apparatus that accompanied
the United States into the twentieth centu-
ry and, soon enough, World War I, was
beginning, albeit at the expense ofmany a
young man sent to the battlefield, to be put
together from many theoretical pieces dur-
ing the war of 1861-1865.
The Civil War forced nineteenth cen-
tury American doctors to make decisions
of life and death on a massive scale while
simultaneously enabling them to empiri-
cally determine the answers to their ques-
tions of the day. Medicine and surgery
were still a great distance away from what
we know as "modem," but the foundations
had already been laid before this tragic
war began. Starting in 1861, the gruesome
casualties en masse ofthe firstmodem war
forced physicians to decide the course that
modem medicine and surgery would take.
Arguments were still flying back and forth
on issues such as the use ofanesthesia, the
management of hemorrhage, and the pro-
cedures and proper use of amputation.
Sadly, manyAmerican young men quickly
became the live bodies to be experimented
upon in the resolution of surgery's press-
ing dilemmas. This was an experimenta-
tion that was forced upon the medical
community, not elected by it. When faced
with casualties on such a large scale, the
surgeon is compelled to do whatever he
can, whether or not he fully understands
the mechanisms involved. This forced
practice ground for surgeons resolved
some ofthe crucial theoretical questions of
the nineteenth century medical field, push-
ing the country and the world further
toward modemization of medicine.
Unfortunately, however, the wounded
of the War of the Rebellion could find lit-
tle comfort in what was to come. A stageWeiss: Medicine andsurgery during the American Civil War 177
of experimentation is a stage of transition
and a stage of transition never provides
universal benefits. While many enjoyed
relative health after a clean amputation
conducted under somewhat sterile condi-
tions in a hospital, many more suffered the
tortures of pyemia and osteomyelitis
which followed an incorrect procedure
that left them open to little understood
infections. The man on the field could not
understand the enormity ofthe sacrifice he
was making, both to the future ofhis coun-
try and to the future of his countrymen's
health.
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